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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
JUNE LYNN VAZQUEZ
)
AKA THOMAS,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

Nos. 44737, 44738
Ada County Case Nos.
CR-FE-2016-5701, CR-FE-2016-33665

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
June Lynn Vazquez appeals from her sentences for two convictions for
possession of methamphetamine and the denial of her Rule 35 motion.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Vazquez with possession of methamphetamine,
possession of “bath salts,” and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp. 5051.)

The state also charged Vazquez with a persistent violator sentencing
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enhancement. (R., pp. 58-59.) In a separate, subsequently filed case the state
charged Vazquez with possession of methamphetamine, driving without
privileges, and providing false information to a law enforcement officer. (R., pp.
152-53.) The district court consolidated the cases and Vazquez entered pleas of
guilty to two counts of possession of methamphetamine and enhancements for
having a prior drug conviction. (R., pp. 100-03, 157-59; Tr., p. 5, L. 6 – p. 6, L. 1;
p. 14, L. 19 – p. 16, L. 6.) The district court imposed concurrent sentences of ten
years with three years determinate. (R., pp. 111-13, 171-73; Tr., p. 28, L. 21 – p.
32, L. 9.) Vazquez filed timely notices of appeal. (R., pp. 115-16, 175-76.)
Vazquez filed motions for reconsideration of the sentences. (R., pp. 11928, 179-88.) The district court denied the motions. (Aug., pp. 1-4.)

ISSUES
Vazquez states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court abuse is discretion when it imposed a
unified aggregate sentence of ten years with three years
fixed, upon Ms. Vazquez, following her guilty plea to two
counts of possession of a controlled substance?

II.

Did the district court abuse is discretion when it denied Ms.
Vazquez’s Rule 35 motion?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Vazquez failed to show the district court abused its discretion by
imposing concurrent sentences of ten years with three years determinate
upon Vazquez’ convictions for two counts of possession of
methamphetamine with prior drug conviction enhancements?

2.

Has Vazquez failed to show an abuse of discretion in the denial of her
Rule 35 motion?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Vazquez Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
A.

Introduction
The district court imposed concurrent sentences (concurrent with each

other and concurrent with a prior sentence being executed for a parole violation)
of ten years with three years determinate on Vazquez’ convictions for possession
of methamphetamine with an enhancement for a prior drug conviction. (R., pp.
111-13, 171-73; Tr., p. 28, L. 21 – p. 32, L. 9.) On appeal Vazquez “contends
the district court should have sentenced her to a lesser term of imprisonment in
light of the mitigating factors, including her mental health and substance abuse
issues, recent death of a close family friend, employment history, and education.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) Review of the record shows no abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
“When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, this Court considers

the entire length of the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016). “Where a sentence is not
illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable, and thus a
clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Jimenez, 159 Idaho 466, 474, 362 P.3d 541,
549 (Ct. App. 2015).
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C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
“The objectives of criminal punishment are protection of society,

deterrence of the individual and the public, possibility of rehabilitation, and
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing, with the primary objective being the
protection of society.” State v. Jimenez, 160 Idaho 540, 544, 376 P.3d 744, 748
(2016) (internal citations omitted). See also State v. Reale, 158 Idaho 20, 23,
343 P.3d 49, 52 (Ct. App. 2014) (“A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it
appears at the time of sentencing that confinement is necessary to accomplish
the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case.”
(quotation omitted)).

“The district court has the discretion to weigh those

objectives and give them differing weights when deciding upon the sentence.”
State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, ___, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017).
As bases for the sentencing decision the district court noted that these
were, respectively, Vazquez’ fifth and sixth felony convictions; that prior
treatment and rehabilitation efforts had failed; and that Vazquez committed the
crimes while, respectively, on parole and pre-trial release. (Tr., p. 28, L. 21 – p.
30, L. 20.) The court concluded Vazquez needed a “very substantial period of
sobriety,” that addressing the problem in a community setting was not “remotely
feasible,” and that Vazquez had not shown any motivation to change. (Tr., p. 30,
L. 21 – p. 31, L. 20.) Review of the record supports the district court’s exercise of
sentencing discretion.
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Vazquez was released on parole on January 27, 2016. (PSI, p. 9.) On
May 3, 2016, she was arrested for possessing “multiple baggies” of
methamphetamine which she was “weighing and packaging.” (PSI, p. 4.) She
was re-released from custody on August 1, 2016.

(PSI, p. 10.)

Vazquez

relapsed and began using methamphetamine a few days after her release and
absconded shortly after that, so the parole commission and the district court
issued warrants for her arrest. (PSI, p. 10; R., pp. 73-76, 84.) Officers arrested
her on the outstanding warrants on October 11, 2016, and found 1.5 grams of
methamphetamine on her person. (PSI, p. 4.) These felonies are only the latest
in a very long history of criminal convictions, mostly drug related but also
including forgeries and theft. (PSI, pp. 5-9.)
Vazquez has been on parole or probation multiple times, generally without
rehabilitative success of any sort.

(PSI, pp. 5-10.)

She does have a self-

reported history of mental illness and a long history of addiction. (PSI, pp. 12-14;
see also PSI, pp. 19-30.) The record supports the district court’s conclusion that
Vazquez needed a period of sobriety and that treatment in the community was
not feasible. (Tr., p. 30, L. 21 – p. 31, L. 20.)
On appeal Vazquez argues that a fixed portion of no more than one year
is reasonable to address her “significant issues.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-7.)
She cites that fact she “has spent over half of her life battling her drug addiction”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6) as evidence that this time she will succeed. She cites her
claim that sobriety is “one of the most important aspects” of her life (Appellant’s
brief, p. 6) without acknowledging the district court’s contrary factual
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determination (Tr., p. 31, Ls. 2-3 (“I don’t see that she has battled her addiction at
all.”).) She points to her claim that her most recent relapse was the result of a
tragic death (Appellant’s brief, p. 6) but fails to acknowledge that it was just one
of a long line of relapses, all the consequence of some setback or another (PSI,
pp. 4-10).
Vazquez next argues that “[w]hen sober” she “leads a productive life and
contributes to society” by attending school, working, and maintaining her own
residence. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-7.) The record reflects that, in the almost
seven years between when she first went to prison and when she went back this
time, Vazquez attended college for two years, was employed for about four
months total, and had her own residence, with her daughter living with her, for an
unknown amount of time. (Appellant’s brief, p. 6 (citing PSI, pp. 9, 12).) The
record shows, however, that her only extended periods of stability are when she
is incarcerated. (PSI, pp. 9-10.)
Vazquez has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion. To
the contrary, review of the record supports the district court’s exercise of
discretion.

II.
Vazquez Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It
Denied Her Motion For Reconsideration Of Her Sentence
A.

Introduction
In denying Vazquez’ motion for reconsideration, the district court stated:

“The Court stated its reasons for the sentence it imposed on the record at the
time of sentencing. All of those reasons remain valid. The sentence was fair.”
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(Aug., pp. 2, 4.)

On appeal Vazquez contends the district court abused its

discretion by “limit[ing] the information it considered.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)
Specifically, she contends the district court “did not consider” the six letters she
attached to her motion. (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) Vazquez has failed to show an
abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
“A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea

for leniency, addressed to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Burggraf,
160 Idaho 177, 180, 369 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2016). “When presenting a
Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light
of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in
support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d
838, 840 (2007).

C.

Vazquez Failed To Show The Sentence Was Excessive In Light Of New
Information
Attached to Vazquez’ brief were six letters. (R., pp. 124-28, 184-88.) The

brief specifically cited to these letters in support of the argument that achieving
the goals of sentencing “may still be accomplished by reducing the sentence in
this case.” (R., pp. 122, 182.) The district court rejected this argument on the
basis that the grounds for the sentence articulated at sentencing “remain valid.”
(Aug., pp. 2, 4.) Review of the record shows that the district court was correct.
The letter from Art Bech stated he knew Vazquez from his “weekly stays
at the hotel” and offered his opinion that Vazquez would “do what was
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necessary” to overcome the obstacles in her life. (R., pp. 124, 184.) The letter
from Carolyn Nickerson stated she knew Vazquez from A.A. meetings and
opined that Vazquez “has the potential to be a productive citizen of society” and
her willingness to be Vazquez’ “accountability partner.”

(R., pp. 125, 185.)

Megan Mattocks wrote that she was a “dear friend” of Vazquez and believes
Vazquez has many fine attributes. (R., pp. 126, 186.) Vazquez’ daughter wrote
that she was “willing to support” her mother by helping her attend meetings and
appointments and get a job. (R., pp. 127, 187.) Jennie Ruybal offered to help
Vazquez with rides, hold her accountable for her actions, and help her build a
relationship with her daughter, get a job, and make sure she gets to
appointments. (R., pp. 127, 187.) Shawntia Nall was willing to help Vazquez get
to meetings, get her classes done and keep her appointments. (R., pp. 128,
188.) Because Vazquez’ horrible track record on probation and parole was well
established despite this support structure, the district court was well within its
discretion to conclude that the reasons for the sentence remained valid. (Aug.,
pp. 2, 4.)
Vazquez argues that the letters show her “good character” and that she
could “rely on a strong support network to help her stay sober, obtain
employment, and develop positive relationships.” (Appellant’s briefs, p. 9.) She
faults the district court for concluding they were not “additional evidence.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10.) However, the district court specifically noted that
Vazquez had submitted a brief (Aug., pp. 1, 3), and the letters are both
specifically addressed in that brief and are attached thereto (R., pp. 121-28, 181-
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88). Vazquez has failed to show that the district court declined to consider the
letters.
Moreover, the letters are not new or additional information, and do not call
into question the district court’s analysis or reasoning.

None of the authors

claimed that Vazquez’ character was new, or that their support was but recently
offered.

Neither their assessment of her character nor their willingness to

support Vazquez had prevented Vazquez’ utter and repeated failures on
probation and parole. These letters do not show the sentence to be excessive.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment and order
denying the motion for reconsideration.
DATED this 21st day of June, 2017.

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 21st day of June, 2017, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an
electronic copy to:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
KKJ/dd
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